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Introduction
Since 1963, when New Hampshire enacted the first lottery legislation, states have 
been rushing to tap into the new source of tax revenues. The first wave of legislation 
by states was to enact state-run lotteries, with the exception of New Jersey, which also 
allowed casinos in Atlantic City.1 In 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Act, 
which allowed commercial gambling on Indian reservations. As public opinion and 
attitudes towards gambling changed, more and more states started to deregulate the 
industry and compete with their neighbors by allowing various forms of casino-type 
games in search of tax revenues. 
Several studies have examined the effects of competition within a state, between two 
states, or within the industry, but few studies have examined the impact of competition 
for casino revenues from a regional perspective and the impact it has on the prices paid 
by casino patrons. By examining both issues states will be able to better estimate the 
impact of their expansion decisions on tax revenues from casino expansion. Furthermore, 
the analysis should reveal if competition has any benefits to casino patrons as standard 
theory would argue. 
The Mid-Atlantic States is an excellent region in which to study competition in the 
casino market.2 New Jersey was the lone state with casinos in that region for close to 
two decades. Then a wave of legalization came in the mid 1990’s when Delaware (1996) 
and West Virginia (1997) loosened restrictions on gambling after the recession of 1992. 
They limited gaming to slot-type activities. The second wave occurred in the next decade 
when New York (2004) entered the market with Pennsylvania (2007) and Maryland 
(2010) close behind. The initial laws in these three states also limited gaming to slot-type 
activities. Competition among the states for casino revenues intensified as the third wave 
started after Maryland’s entry; some states broadened their gaming offerings to include 
table games and allowed casinos in new locations in their quest to maintain and increase 
revenues. As one popular blogger noted, New York’s lack of table games has put the state 
at a competitive disadvantage:
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1 Prior to 1963 the only state that allowed casinos was Las Vegas. However, some states allowed civic 
organizations to offer bingo and other games of chance to raise money while others allowed horse and dog 
racing. After 1963, the states or tribes received tax revenues or ran gaming activities.
2 For the purpose of this study the Mid-Atlantic States include Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia.
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“Is New York losing out on the gambling gold rush? Supporters of an 
amendment to expand casino gambling certainly think so. And they’re framing 
their campaign to push voters on the issue by saying the Empire State is losing 
at least one billion dollars to full-blown casinos in other states.” (State of 
Politics, 2013)
The impact of this intense level of competition among the states can be captured by 
the application of spatial econometric analysis. Spatial econometric analysis captures 
the interdependence of casino revenues among the geographic regions and estimates 
spillover effects from changes in explanatory variables within states as well as among 
the states. Thus, the amount of cannibalization between states from the expansion of 
casinos in the Mid-Atlantic States can be estimated. In addition to this unique modeling 
of casino revenues, data from two states (Pennsylvania and New Jersey) will allow the 
examination of the prices paid by patrons during this period of expansion. 
Review of the Literature
The casino competition literature has generally focused its attention in two areas: 
competition among the states and competition within the industry from new entry. Only 
a few authors have examined competition and pricing. 
Competition among States and within Industry 
The earliest studies by Nichols (1998) and Atkins, Nichols, and Olsen (2000) 
illustrated the competition between Iowa and Illinois for gambling tax revenues. 
Iowa was the first to allow riverboat gambling in 1992.3 Illinois observed Iowa’s tax 
revenue windfall and quickly enacted its own version of riverboat gambling to compete 
for casino dollars. The decline in attendance and tax revenues in Iowa prompted 
Iowa lawmakers to relax some of their regulations to regain some of the gamblers 
from Illinois that Iowa had lost and to attract new Iowans to the market. (Nichols, 
1998) 
Walker and Jackson (2008), McGowan (2009), and Condliffe (2012) examined 
competition among the states. While Walker and Jackson’s main focus was to explore 
the cannibalization within the gambling industry, they also studied the impact of 
gambling in neighboring states on the industry. Examining the U.S. market between 
1985 and 2000, they found neighboring states with gambling do have a negative impact 
on the casinos within a state, but this impact appears to be slight. Walker and Jackson 
used the percent of neighboring states having a competing industry as a means of 
assessing interstate competition where “neighboring state” is defined as any state that is 
adjacent to it. Given that states are geographically fixed, the two neighboring states of 
Florida individually will have a bigger impact on Florida’s casinos than anyone of the 
seven neighboring states of Colorado on Colorado’s casinos. McGowan and Condliffe 
examined states in the Mid-Atlantic region. McGowan did an early analysis of the 
impact of Pennsylvania’s entry into the casino industry on Atlantic City’s casinos as 
well as the Atlantic City-Philadelphia casino market. McGowan forecasted Atlantic 
City casino revenues in 2007 based on 2000-2006 data using a simple trend model of 
seasonal data. His finding suggested that Atlantic City lost over $110 million dollars, 
but the overall Atlantic City-Philadelphia market grew by over $460 million. While 
McGowan did not include Delaware’s influence in the adjustment of Philadelphia’s 
casino revenues, Condliffe did. Condliffe extended the analysis to include three 
more years of data and examined three more specifications of the McGowan model, 
3 Delaware in 1994 allowed video lottery machines at racetracks (which are commonly called racinos), but 
state competition for the revenues did not start until ten years later. For eight of the ten years, neighboring 
Pennsylvania had a Republican Governor who did not support the expansion of gaming in the state.
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specifications which included other regressors. Examining aggregate casino revenue 
for the region, Condliffe found that the addition of casinos in Pennsylvania led to a 
slight decline in regional gambling spending of $1,262 per month.4 The implication 
of Condliffe’ s findings is that competition may have increased Pennsylvania casino 
revenues, but the loss in neighboring gambling revenues was greater than Pennsylvania’s 
gain. This loss, however, was relatively small – less than .01% of mean monthly 
revenues. 
Ali and Thalheimer (2003), Hunter (2010), and Walker and Nesbit (2014) examined 
the impact of new casino entry on existing casinos. Ali and Thalheimer found that a new 
casino (commercial or tribal) in the Missouri-Iowa-Illinois region had a relatively small 
negative impact on competing casinos; the decline in the slot handle was approximately 
3%. Hunter’s analysis showed a more significant impact on the market. His analysis of 
100 casinos across the country over a fourteen-year period indicated that adding a casino 
next door (within three miles of an existing casino) helped existing casinos’ aggregate 
gross revenue (AGR) by an average of $14 million, while adding a casino outside the 
three-mile radius hurt existing casinos’ AGR by as much as $15 million on average. 
It appears that next-door casinos benefit existing casinos by helping to create gaming 
“destinations” is capturing the gaming destination strategies of Las Vegas and Atlantic 
City. Walker and Nesbit used a spatial competition model to estimate the impact of a 
casino in the Missouri market. The spatial model captures both the direct effects of 
competition as well as feedback effects from the change in competition. In general they 
found that a one percent increase in neighboring casinos’ AGR leads to a .116 percent 
decline in a casino’s AGR, holding slots and table games constant.5 However, when 
neighboring casinos increase both slots and table games, there is a slightly bigger impact 
after the market adjusts. A one percent increase in slots and tables causes a .136 percent 
decline in casino’s revenue. 
Competition and Prices
Kilby et al. (2005) and Siu (2011) have explored the issue of price competition 
from two perspectives. Kilby et al. approached the issue of pricing from a practical 
operational management perspective while Siu developed a theoretical foundation 
for casino prices. Kilby et al. note that, from a practical standpoint, a change in the 
minimum bet is a means of managing “price” and is easier to adjust when there is excess 
demand or supply. Siu combines Kilby et al.’s practical with the theoretical. According 
to Siu, the price is determined by the interaction between suppliers (the casino) and 
demanders (the patrons). The casino’s view of price is composed of two parts: the 
theoretical price of the game and the minimum bet. Siu writes, “The theoretical price 
of a game by itself merely represents a desired positive expected return after taking 
into consideration the rules of the game…” (p. 268). This expected return is called 
“the house’s advantage of the game,” and is realized over an extended period of time. 
For certain games, such as slot machines, the house advantage can be modified, but a 
casino’s adjustment is limited in some cases by state minimum payout regulations. Thus, 
Sui argues that a measurement of price for a single game is the house advantage times 
the weighted average of the minimum bets (p.275).
The patron’s view of price is not only based on the house advantage, but also based 
on “tradition,” a term that encompasses the perceived fairness of the game as well as the 
patron’s valuation of the gambling experience. Siu categorizes patrons into two groups 
according to experience: those that look at the gambling experience as a form of leisure, 
and those at that are concerned about potential losses. For the former type of patrons, 
4 Condliffe’s models most complete model included Pennsylvania and Delaware casino data as regressors. It 
is not clear why N.J. casino regressors were omitted.
5 The estimates are provided by the authors. This first relationship is called the spatial autoregressive 
coefficient, and the second is the total average impact from a change in the two variables. 
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the act of playing has entertainment value, may plan on an expected payout of zero, 
expecting to win nothing. The limiting “pricing” factor for these patrons is the minimum 
bet, and this limit is only binding to patrons if the perceived available minimum bet 
does not produce entertainment value equal to the alternative leisure activities. Thus, as 
Kilby suggested, in the event that demand exceeds supply, the minimum bet can increase 
to ration patrons. Ex post, the patrons’ experience at a casino may impact subsequent 
estimates of expected payouts and decisions to go there in the future.
Other patrons who are interested in gambling will include the expected payout as a 
consideration in their decision calculus, according to Siu. These patrons are more price-
sensitive and are looking for a “better deal.” They are willing to play for longer periods 
to gain an advantage (Siu, 2011, p. 270). Thus, the house advantage is critical to those 
patrons’ demand for casino services.
Siu’s price theory approach suggests that the market price for casino gambling will 
differ based on the degree of competition the casino faces. Local monopolies would 
have some price leverage, and, as long as there is excess capacity, the house advantage 
could be high with low bet minimums. Entry of new casinos into the market reduces 
transportation costs and will lower demand for existing casinos. Theory suggests that 
casinos will start to compete through different means: direct changes in price as well as 
indirect changes such as offering promotions. These promotions can be in several forms: 
sweepstakes, room deals, slot dollars, and free plays. 
The Mid-Atlantic Casino Market: Evidence and Analysis
To better understand the degree of competition in the Mid-Atlantic States an 
overview of the data is given. The spending trends in the region and among the states 
show the intensity of the competition in the region. Following the overview, a spatial 
analysis for the region is presented. The spatial analysis will rigorously examine 
the impact of casino expansion on state and regional casino revenues (hereafter 
called adjusted gross revenues, or AGR). Finally, an analysis of price competition in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey is presented. Both states provide data on wagers, payouts, 
and promotions. As competition increases in the region we would expect the “price” for 
gaming to decrease. 
Overview of Mid-Atlantic Casino Market 
Data on the Mid-Atlantic States were collected from state agencies. Adjusted gross 
revenues (AGR) is the money “left on the table”, and is estimated by the total amount 
of wagering less the payouts to the patrons. As can be seen in Figure 1, AGR in the 
region grew from $4 billion to over $10 billion between 1997 and 2012, while the 
number of casinos increased from slightly under 20 to over 50 by 2012.6 While casino 
spending grew, the number of casinos grew at a faster rate. Between 2006 and 2012 
casinos grew 58.3%, while casino spending grew only 33.6%, resulting in a drop in the 
AGR per casino from $226 million to $177 million. This suggests that the increased 
access opened opportunities to patrons to participate and may have accomplished 
state objectives of capturing out-of-state casino spending. However, it appears that the 
expansion has also lowered market share per casino.
 
6 A casino is defined in the traditional sense as a stand-alone facility. West Virginia is the only state that 
allows slots machine on a small scale. These locations were not included in the casino count. However, 
to make a comparison between states, a proxy was used for the number of casinos in West Virginia. This 
proxy was based on the average slots per casino in the region. Thus, WV had about 4 additional “casinos” 
operating in the state by 2012. 
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Figure 1. Trends in Casinos and Adjusted Gross Revenue in the Mid-Atlantic Region
An overview of interstate casino competition can be seen in Figure 2, where the 
percentage of AGR relative to state income each year from 1997 to 2012 is presented. In 
West Virginia, AGR is more important to the state economy than in the other states and 
had significant growth up until 2007. This growth is due in part to the lack of competition 
among its neighboring states. Once Pennsylvania (2007) and Maryland (2010) entered the 
market, there was a noticeable downturn. New Jersey, which was fully operating eleven 
casinos in 1997, saw a constant decline over the period. From 1997 to 2002, the decline 
could be attributed to Delaware (1996) and West Virginia (1997) entering the market. 
Between 2003 and 2007 casino AGR appeared to stabilize. After 2007 when New York and 
Pennsylvania entered the market both New Jersey and Delaware showed a sharp decline. 
While Pennsylvania can be identified as a possible cause for the decline in other states, it 
appears that Maryland’s entry into the market may have slowed Pennsylvania’s trend.
Figure 2. AGR as a Percentage of Gross State Product 
Spatial Empirical Model of Interstate Casino Competition
Spatial Autoregressive Model
Given the nature of the data, a spatial autoregressive regression model (SAR) is used 
to identify the impact of competition among the states.7 The SAR model takes the general 
matrix form:
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7 For an overview of SAR models see Le Sage and Pace, and Elhorst in the Handbook of Applied Spatial 
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variable (WY). The spatially lagged dependent variable is a we ghted dependent variable 
of the neighboring states with the matrix W as the set of weights. The weights can be as 
simple as equal weights of contiguous states. (In this study the weights are based on 
distances between casinos of different states and will be developed below.) The value of 
this model is the inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable that captures both 
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Y = λWY + Xβ +µ      (1)
where Y is a n x 1 vector, W is an n x n weighted matrix of neighboring states, X is an 
n x r matrix of exogenous variables, β is an r x1 vector of the estimated parameters, 
and λ is a scalar estimated parameter. Spatial regression models account for the spatial 
dependence among the observations, and is denoted by the “spatially lagged” dependent 
variable (WY). The spatially lagged dependent variable is a weighted dependent variable 
of the neighboring states with the matrix W as the set of weights. The weights can be 
as simple as equal weights of contiguous states. (In this study the weights are based on 
distances between casinos of different states and will be developed below.) The value 
of this model is the inclusion of the spatially lagged dependent variable that captures 
both direct impacts of neighboring states as well as indirect impact on neighboring 
states. For this study spatial dependence implies that a change in the adjusted gross 
real revenue (AGRR) of neighboring states would have an impact on an observe state’s 
AGRR. If there is spatial dependence, there are significant implications when considering 
a change in the rth explanatory variable (Xr). A change in Xr in a state not only has a 
direct impact on a state’s AGRR, it will also have an indirect impact on the AGRR of its 
neighbor’s. As noted by Le Sage and Pace, “this is, of course, the logical consequence 
of our simultaneous spatial dependence model. A change in the characteristics of 
neighboring regions can set in motion changes in the dependent variable that will impact 
the dependent variable in neighboring regions. These impacts will continue to diffuse 
through the system of regions.” (Le Sage and Pace, 2009, p. 369).
The direct and indirect impacts can be illustrated by estimating the predictions from 
equation (1):
 
E(AGRR) = Wm Xβ,      (2)
where Wm = (I- λW)
-1 = I + λW + λ2W2 + λ3W3 + … Wm is commonly called the 
multiplier matrix. The impact of a change in Xr is no longer β, but it is much more 
complicated as noted above: a change in Xr within a particular state will have a 
direct impact on the state’s casino AGRR, but it also includes spillover effects on the 
neighboring state (W), as well as neighbors spilling over to neighbors (W2) and so on.
 For a λ not equal to zero, the expected AGRR in each state for K variables, given six 
regional states, can be derived from equation (2) for a change in Xr:
E =  βr       (3)
              is the direct impact from a change in Xr of the i
th state while                are the 
indirect impacts on neighboring state j from a change in Xr from the i
th state, and the 
matrix elements include higher-order neighboring relationships.8 
The coefficient λ is a scalar parameter that determines the average strength of 
association among the states, and is known as the spatial autoregressive coefficient which 
has a value between -1 and +1. Similar to the autocorrelation coefficient in a time series 
model, the closer the (absolute) value is to 1, the greater the feedback and persistence 
among the states in the region. Statistical tests of λ provide evidence of the presence 
of spatial correlation. A negative sign indicates that casinos in neighboring states are 
substitutes and compete with one another. A positive sign indicates that casinos in 
neighboring states are complements and support one another in their development. An 
estimated λ of 0 indicates that there is no global spatial dependence.
8 The value of Wmii does not necessarily have a value of 1. This is due to “feedback loops”. (Le Sage and 
Pace 2009, p.35) Region i is a neighbor to state, and a change within a state will impact the neighboring 
state, and the neighbor’s adjustments will have a residual, feedback impact on region i.
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in the rth xplanatory variable (Xr). A change n Xr in a st te no  ly has a direct impact 
on a st te’s AGRR, it will also hav  an indirect impact on the AGRR of its neighbor’s. 
As noted by Le Sage and Pace, “thi  is, of c urse, the logical onsequ nc  of our 
simultaneous spatial depend c  model. A change in the characteristic  of neighb ring 
regions can set in motion chang s in the depend t v riable at will impact the
depend t variable in neighboring re ions. These impacts will continue to d ffuse 
through th system of regio s.” (Le Sage and Pace, 2009, p. 369). 
The direct and i irect impacts an be illustrated by estimating the pr dictions 
from equation (1): 
  
E(AGRR) = Wm Xβ,      (2) 
 
where Wm = (I- λW)-1 = I + λW + λ2W2 + λ3W3 + … Wm is commonly called the
multip ier matrix. The impact of a change in Xr is no longer β, but it is much more 
complicated as noted above: a change i  Xr with n a particular state will have a direct 
impact on the st te’s ca in  AGRR, but it also includes spil over effects on the
neighboring sta e (W), as well as neighbors spilling over to neighbors (W2) and so on. 
 For a λ not equal o zero, the xp ct d AGRR n each state for K variables, given six
regional states, can be derived from equation (2) for a change in Xr:
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𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋2
.
  𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋6  
 βr    (3) 
 
βr 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 is the direct impact from a change in Xr of the ith st t  βr 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 r
indirect impacts on neighboring sta e j from a change i r  the ith state, and the
matrix elem nts include hig er-order n ighboring rel t .8  
The coefficient λ is a c lar p rameter that de ermin s the average strength of 
association among the states, and is known as the spati l t r r ssive coefficient which 
has a value betw en -1 and +1. Similar to the autocorrelati  c efficient i  a time series 
model, the closer the (absolute) value is to 1, the gr ater the fe dback and persistenc  
among the states in the region. Statistical tests of λ provide evidenc  of the pr senc  of 
spatial correlation. A negative sign indicates hat c sinos in neighboring states are
sub titu es and compete with one another. A positive sign indicates hat c sinos in 
neighboring states are complements and support ne another in their development. An
estimated λ of 0 indicates hat there is no gl bal spatial depend c . 
Since each state has a unique outcome from a change in X, LeSage and Pace 
(2009) formally defin  th Average Direct Impacts (ADI) from a change in X as [∑Wmii 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The value of Wmii does not ecessarily have  value of 1. This is due to “feedback loops”. (Le
Sage nd Pace 2009, p.35) Region  is a neighbor to state, nd  ch nge within a state will impact 
the neighboring state, nd the neighbor’s adjustments will have  residual, feedback impact on 
region .  
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Since each state has a unique outcome from a change in X, LeSage and Pace (2009) 
formally define the Average Direct Impacts (ADI) from a change in X as [∑Wmii /n]*βr 
and the Average Total Impact (ATI) as the sum of the ith column (∑Wmii/n)*βr (i≠j) as 
a means of interpreting the impacts on Y.9 The difference between ATI and ADI is the 
Average Indirect Impact which measures the spatial spillovers falling on other regions.
Empirical Model
Panel data were gathered from six state casino regulatory bodies, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, and the U.S. Census, producing seventy-four observations between 
1997 and 2012. Given some slight differences in state reports, estimates were made for 
a few states; a detailed discussion of the data and variables are given in the Appendix. 
All nominal variables were adjusted using the state’s GSP price index to reflect real 
dollars. Since states are interested in tax revenues from gaming, real AGR is used as the 
dependent variable. Two models were examined: a linear model and a log model. The 
first model examined is:
AGRRit = βo + β1 RGSPit+ β2 Tablesit + β3 Neighbor Slotsit + β4 Accessit + β5 Access
2
it +  
β6 Casinosit (+ β7a PreDEit ) + β7b DEit (+ β8a PreWVit )+ β8b WVit + β9 MDit + β10 NYit + 
(β11 PreNJit )+ β12 PAit + λ (λ2)WAGRRjt + µit.
And the second model is:
LAGRRit = αo + α1 LRGSPit + α2 Tablesit + α3 LNeighbor Slotsit + α4 LAccessit + 
α5 LCasinosit + α 6a PreDEit + α6 DEit +α7a PreWVit + α7 WVit + α8 MDit + α9 NYit + 
α 11 PreNJit + α12 PAit + φWLAGRRjt + εit , 
where the “L” before the variable indicates the log of the variable. AGRR is the 
adjusted gross real revenue from the gaming activity; i.e. wagers played by gamblers 
less payouts to gamblers. RGSP is the state’s real gross state product. Table is a dummy 
variable indicating if state i allowed table games in its casinos in period t. Neighbor 
Slots is the number of slot machines that bordered state i when the state had gaming in 
time period t.10 Access is the number of slots divided by the population density of the 
county in which the casino resides and in contiguous counties in period t.11 Casinos 
is the number of casinos operating in state i in time period t.12 State dummies are also 
included with New Jersey representing the benchmark state. For the established states a 
pre-competition dummy was used to distinguish the two periods. These states are New 
Jersey, Delaware, and West Virginia. 
WAGRRj is called the spatially autoregressive (lag) variable. It is a weighted average 
of the real AGR of neighboring states. States closer to each other are more likely to have 
greater interdependence than states further away. There were three steps in constructing 
the weights within the matrix. First, distances were estimated between casinos among 
the states. In the event that there were several potential pairs of casinos between states, 
the closest distance was used. If a state did not have a casino the distance was from the 
largest population center to the casino. Second, the inverse of the distance was used. 
Casinos closer together will have greater impact than those further away. Finally, each 
neighboring state (j) was assigned a “closeness” percentage by dividing each state’s 
9  Since the Wm matrix is row normalize to equal one, the sum of the row would be a weighted average.
10 Pennsylvania was broken into 3 regions (East, Central, and West) and the number of slots in each region was  
  used to calculate the neighboring state’s slots. Ohio was also used as a border state 
11  Population density was constructed by interpolating the 2000 and 2010 population density estimates 
  assuming constant growth during the period.
12 West Virginia had a unique model of gaming. They allowed between 5-10 VLT at various venues in the state, 
and the wins were included in the total wins of the state. A casino equivalent was use by dividing the number 
of non-casino LVTs by the average LVT’s at WV casinos.
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inverse distance by the total among the neighbors for a given period.13 Thus, for an 
individual state in time period t, the spatial autoregressive variable is
WAGRRit = ∑[Inverse Distjt / ∑ Inverse Distjt ]x AGRRjt for all j ≠ i. (4)
Since casinos could enter and exit, the weights could change in different periods. 
When a casino enters, and it is closer to a neighboring state than an existing casino, the 
distance is recalibrated and the weights for the period are recalculated.14
Expected Hypotheses and Results
The hypotheses are based on the previous literature on the casino market. AGRR 
in a state’s industry should increase with the state’s real gross state product, with the 
addition of table games to the list of gaming activities, and with the increase in the 
number of casinos. The number of neighboring slot machines15 should directly compete 
with another states gaming activity, and result in a decline in AGRR. Access is the ratio 
of the number of slots in a given state at time period t relative to the average population 
density of the state casino market. The more slots machines that are available, the greater 
the potential for gamblers to play and AGRR to grow. However, slot growth should 
result in a slowdown in AGRR as the market becomes saturated. Finally, the spatial 
autoregressive coefficient is expected to be negative. Kao and Bera (2013) noted that in 
the spatial econometrics literature, where there is spatial competition among the regions, 
the autoregressive coefficient is negative.16 
The results of the GMM regressions with adjusted Newey-West standard errors are 
presented in Table 1.17 The statistical significance of the spatial coefficient will be used 
to determine regional interdependence. Once regional interdependence is known, an 
analysis of the coefficients will follow.
Each model explains at least 97% of the variation in adjusted gross real revenues 
and the signs are as expected. In the level models, all non-state dummy variables 
are significant at least at the 10% level of significance. The interpretations of the 
coefficients are based on the autoregressive coefficient of the weighted dependent 
variable (WAGRR). The statistically significant negative sign is consistent with other 
research in which there is competition among jurisdictions.18 This statistical dependence 
filters throughout the model as noted in equation 3, and a change in one of the X’s will 
lead to adjustments throughout the region. The signs in the table are indicative of the 
relationship, but the impact of each variable has to be evaluated based on the interactions 
among the states. These interactions can be divided into total, direct and indirect. Given 
the relative geographic locations of the states, the direct and indirect impacts differ. A 
state like Pennsylvania, surrounded by neighbors with legal casinos, is likely to have 
larger feedback effects and spillover effects. As noted above, estimates of the average, 
total, direct, and indirect can be used to analyze regional impacts. Table 2 provides the 
total, direct, and indirect average impacts along with the range of individual impacts for 
13 In the case of the paring of Pennsylvania and Maryland when they both had no casinos, the intermediate 
calculation was not made and a zero was assigned in the final matrix.
14 There are various weighting schemes that could be used. The distance between casinos seemed to be most 
appropriate to identify the degree of competition.
15 Video lottery terminals are considered in this study as equivalent to slot machines.
16 According to Koa and Bera spatial cooperation among regions typically yields a positive autoregressive 
coefficient. 
17 OLS estimation of spatially dependent regions yields inconsistent and inefficient estimators. GMM is one 
method suggested when the model includes spatial interactions. GMM does not rely on the assumption of 
normality of the errors (Elhorst, 2010). Tests on the residuals from the GMM regressions with state dummy 
variables indicated that there was no heteroscedasticity, but serial correlation was present. Newey-West 
adjusted standard errors were computed to produce valid t-statistics.
18 This estimate is twice as large as the Walker and Nesbit estimate. This larger estimate indicates that the 
competition among the states was stronger than within the states. 
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19 Given that the weighted matrix was row standardized such that the sum of the weights equals one for each 
state, the Average Total Impact will be the same for all states and is equal to 1/(1-λ). The diagonal elements 
of the weighted matrix represent the direct impact. The indirect average impact is the difference and 
represents the sum of all later adjustments by neighboring states.
20 In this model, location of the new casino is embodied within the weighted matrix, and the autoregressive 
coefficient reflects the changes of locations over time.
	  
 
 
Table 1 
Spatial Competition Model of AGRR in the Mid-Atlantic States 1997-2013 
 Model 1 t-stat Sig Model 2 t-stat Sig  Log t-stat Sig 
Intercept -6455.82 -0.01  -6011753 -1.38  -25.34 -2.11 ** 
RGSP (in 000’s) 0.0034 1.91 * 0.0048 2.44 ** 1.98 3.20 *** 
Table 346028 4.19 *** 356848 4.13 *** 0.060 0.47  
Neighbor Slots -19.16 -7.07 *** -15.90 -6.42 *** 0.013 0.70  
Access  62507 2.33 ** 79510 4.29 *** 0.268 3.21 *** 
Access Sq -3088.05 -1.78 * -3574.49 -2.77 ***    
Casinos 113622 8.23 *** 115894 9.70 *** 2.37 13.8 *** 
DE -Pre Comp -41089 -0.77     0.313 2.52 ** 
DE 774613 2.05 ** 1090414 2.75 *** 5.42 6.08 *** 
WV - Pre 
Comp 
-121849 -1.16     0.491 2.62 ** 
WV -66585 -0.16 ** 351826 0.85  4.11 4.37 *** 
MD 754402 3.36 *** 785933 3.74 *** 2.10 4.65 *** 
NY -845299 -2.26 ** -1070699 -2.40 ** -0.444 -0.64  
NJ - Pre Comp -169399 -2.67 ***    -0.253 -1.69 * 
PA 581536 3.10 *** -560333 -2.91  0.345 1.16  
WAGRR -0.35 -2.83 *** -0.36 -3.73 *** -0.38 -4.03 *** 
N 74   74   74   
Adjusted r-
square 
97.6%   97.9%   98.0%   
Note. Dependent variable AGRR is in thousands of dollars. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at 
the 5% level, * 10% significant at the level. 
 
Table 2 
Weighted Matrix (Wm) Multipliers in 2010 
Impacts Average Maximum Minimum 
Total 0.735 0.737 (WV) 0.730 (MD) 
Direct 1.027 1.051 (PA) 1.002 (NY) 
Indirect  -0.292 -0.315 (PA) -0.273 (NY) 
Note: The multiplier is based on the spatial autocorrelation coefficient (λ) of -0.36.   
 
The average direct impact from a change in the exogenous variables is 1.027 
times the coefficient. Based on the spatial lag coefficient, the average total impact on 
AGRR from the change in X is 0.735. From these two estimates, the average indirect 
impact due to competition among the states is -0.292. The state that had the largest direct 
impact was Pennsylvania, while the state that had the smallest impact was New York.  
These direct and indirect impacts can be used to estimate the degree of casino 
competition among the states. When a state opens a new casino, on average, AGRR 
The average direct impact from a change in the exogenous variables is 1.027 times the 
coefficient. Based on the spatial lag coefficient, the average total impact on AGRR from 
the change in X is 0.735. From these two estimates, the average indirect impact due to 
competition among the states is -0.292. The state that had the largest direct impact was 
Pennsylvania, while the state that had the smallest impact was New York. 
These direct and indirect impacts can be used to estimate the degree of casino 
competition among the states. When a state opens a new casino, on average, AGRR 
increases between $116.7 (1.027 x $113.6) and $119.0 (1.027 x 115.9) million in the 
state. However, neighboring states should expect to lose on average between $33.2 (0.297 
x $113.6) and $33.8 (0.297 x $115.9) million AGRR. This loss is due to the recapture 
of patrons that were playing in another state as well as capturing some patrons from the 
neighboring state.20 The net regional gain in AGRR is between $83.5 and 85.2 million. 
the Mid-Atlantic casino market in 2010 for a spatial autoregressive coefficient of -0.36.19
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 In a given state, if the neighboring states increase slot machines by one, the 
expected AGRR, on average, will drop between $16,329 and $19,670. However, the 
slot increase in the neighboring states would improve their AGRR between $4,643 and 
$5,595, resulting in a net loss in gaming revenue for the region of between $11,687 and 
$14,083.21 Base on the two factors discussed, if a state opened a new casino with 2,100 
slot machines, the regional neighbors are likely to lose about $33 million AGRR due to 
the expansion and $27 million AGRR from play of the slots at the new casino for a total 
loss of $60 million. 
To account for saturation of the gambling market at a particular location, the variable 
Access was included in the model. As expected, there is a positive increase in AGRR 
as the number of slots available in a given area (Access increases, but the increase in 
AGRR slows as more slots are added to the particular location. Evaluated at the sample 
mean, as slot density increases by one unit in a state, AGRR increases between $28 and 
$38 million in the state, but regionally the total casino AGRR increases by only $20 to 
$28 million after considering regional losses.22 Given the locational densities of sample, 
the number of slots within the average state could double before AGRR is maximized. 
Finally, the presence of table games (represented by the dummy variable Table) has a 
significant impact on casino revenues. When a state introduced table games, it received 
about $360 million in additional AGRR on average. For the region, the net revenue was 
$257 million; over $100 million less due to the loss in revenues in neighboring states. 
The control variable, Real Gross State Product, is significant and has the expected 
sign. A one million dollar increase in a state’s real gross state product will result, on 
average, in an increase between $3,490 and $4,930 in AGRR depending on the model 
used. Note that the higher real income within the state gets an added boost from its 
interaction with its neighbors. The within-state activity will impact the neighboring 
states’ economic activity, which in turn will result in a slight positive average feedback 
of about 2.7%. However, the real GSP increase of $1 million will also cause AGRR 
to drop in neighboring states between $990 and $1,400 because of individuals staying 
within the state. Thus the results suggest that the net increase in AGRR (ie: the total 
impact) in the region was between $2,500 to $3,530.
In the log model, it appears that casino revenues are highly elastic within the state: a 
1% change in real GSP leads to a direct change in AGRR of 2.03% (1.98 x 1.027). The 
indirect impacts are less elastic with a .57% decline in AGRR. A one percent increase 
in casinos within the state will raise revenues by 2.43%, but will lower neighboring 
states’ AGRR by .19%. The statistical significance on Access suggests that the growth in 
slots in a given market is inelastic. A one percent increase will lead to a .27% increase 
in AGRR, and a net regional increase of only .19%. The introduction of Tables games 
may have increased AGRR, as noted above, but it did not impact the growth rate of the 
revenues. An increase in a neighboring state’s slots did not impact a state’s AGRR. 
Thus, it appears that the casino market has room to grow, but the competition among 
the states appears to erode the regional benefits. Although this study is not estimating a 
steady state, it is clear that expansion may have its limits.23 
Pricing Competition in Pennsylvania & New Jersey
Casinos compete for patrons in four ways: through the amenities they offer, their 
locations, the types of games, and the prices of games. Although the first three are 
important in attracting customers, data are not readily available for them. Price, however, 
can be estimated with available data on wagers, payouts, and promotions in two 
21 Although this model cannot be directly compared to Condliffe, our total estimates are slightly below his. 
22 A slot density to increase by one would imply that there was in increase in the number of slots equal to the 
population density of the area.
23 The results also suggest that any social welfare cost-benefit analysis of gaming should be examined on a 
regional not on a state level.
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states: Pennsylvania and New Jersey. As noted above, a price index for a single game 
is the weighted average of the minimum bet times the house advantage (wagers minus 
payouts). If minimum bets are constant over the period, or they do not increase with 
increased competition, one minus the payout ratio would be a proxy for the price (or 
house advantage) of slot machines. The movement in the price proxy would represent a 
minimum change in price due to competition. In addition to this price proxy, a casino can 
compete in the short-run with promotions. In general these promotions allow individuals 
to play with house money and, thus, improve their expected payout and lower their price. 
Monthly reports for Pennsylvania casinos indicate that the increased number of 
facilities has increased the level of competition and lowered “prices” to slot players by 
raising payouts rates. The three-month moving average of slot machine payout ratios 
for each casino is given below in Figure 3. From the beginning, the payout ratios among 
the casinos ranged between 91% and 93%. The outlier from 2007 to 2010 was Mt. Airy 
Resort, which is classified as a small-resort casino. Once the casino was established, the 
payout ratio for Mt Airy moved towards the average. After mid-2010, the payout ratios 
show a wider range. In June of 2010, casinos were allowed to offer table games, which 
could explain the increase in variation. The average payout was slightly higher after June 
2010, by 0.17%., but the variation in slot payouts among the casinos increased by 0.29%. 
A simple t-test on the average payout and the standard deviation of the 3-month moving 
average suggests that there was a significant difference between periods.24 Increased 
competition would suggest convergence of payout ratios, not an increase in spread unless 
the casinos were resetting payout strategies on slots. 25 
Figure 3. Pennsylvania Casinos: Slot Payouts as a % of Wagers (three month moving 
averages).
Another means of competing is the use of promotions to players. Pennsylvania 
requires casinos to track promotions since this cost can be deducted from revenues before 
taxes are paid to the state. As a percentage of wagers, promotions have been rising over 
the period. (See Figure 4.) As firms entered the market, promotions steadily increased. 
Since slot payout ratios are a function of how the machines are programed, it would 
appear that the casinos used promotions to entice customers. The two casinos on the 
extremes were Mohegan Sun and Hollywood, both of which are racinos.
 
24   The null can be rejected at the 1% level of significance.
25   One possible reason for the slot payout increase is the introduction of table games in Pennsylvania in July  
  2010. The explanation for such an observation is for future discussion.
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Figure 4. Pennsylvania Casinos: Promotions as a % of Wager (three month moving 
averages).
Combining the payout ratio and the promotional ratio will yield what the player 
received in return for his wager. (See Figure 5.) The difference between the wager and 
return on a per-dollar basis is a proxy for the price of gaming services. Over time, the 
Pennsylvania casino player was paying a lower price as competition increased. The 
highest “priced” casino after 2010 was Hollywood in Grantville, formerly Penn National. 
They are located in the middle of the state without any significant competition. The two 
lowest priced casinos were the Sands and the Meadows. The Sands has been one of 
the lowest price providers since it entered the market. It entered late in the market and 
is located between two northern casinos and the southern Philadelphia casinos. This 
suggests that the Sands needed to price below market to build clientele. The Meadows has 
recently shown a large drop in price. The lower price could be due to the recent increase 
in casino activity in Ohio. Overall, the average price dropped from 8.0% to 5.8% in 
Pennsylvania.
Figure 5. Pennsylvania Casinos Price of Gambling (three month moving averages).
The annual industry-wide data for New Jersey casinos suggests the same pattern as 
Pennsylvania.26 The price of playing a slot, one minus the payout ratio, has increased over 
time, moving from 8.1% to 9.0% from 2003 to 2012. (See Figure 6.) During the same 
period the percent of wagers that was returned through promotions increased at a faster 
26 New Jersey monthly data were not available. The reporting of “promotion allowances” was not separated 
between slot and table promotions. The promotion percentage was based on the total handle.  
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pace from 2.4% to 3.8% resulting in a net price decline over the period from 5.7% to 
5.2%. Although the number of casinos was relatively stable over the period, it appears the 
interstate competition had a slight impact on pricing at New Jersey casinos. 
Figure 6. New Jersey Casinos Annual Slot Price and Promotions (percent of handle).
Conclusion
The attraction of tax revenues and the prospects of economic development have 
heightened the competitive climate in the Mid-Atlantic States. Delaware and West 
Virginia were the first to challenge New Jersey in the early 1990’s by allowing casinos 
at all racetracks. During the first decade of the new century, the casino market expanded 
in West Virginia by allowing slots at private adult establishments. New York and 
Pennsylvania soon entered the market, with Maryland the last to approve casinos in 
2008. The increased access to casino facilities stemmed the imports of gamblers by other 
states and increased spending within state markets. The expansion led to growth in tax 
revenues, but it appears that the expansion and competition is starting to erode regional 
gaming tax revenues. It appears that as states find ways to expand access to their markets, 
it is at the expense of their neighbors. Neighboring states lose from 25% to 35% of 
gaming revenues from the expansion within a state. For tax revenue planning purposes, 
this loss can be significant. The evidence also indicates that expansion within the state has 
limits, although the states examined here have not yet saturated the market. The increased 
competition has brought value to the consumer and a slow down or loss in tax revenue. 
Prices appeared to decline in Pennsylvania and New Jersey as competition increased.
It appears that another wave of competition is on the horizon. In 2013, there were 
several initiatives by state legislators and casino owners to find new sources of revenues. 
Since October of 2013 New Jersey has allowed internet gambling.27 Delaware casino 
operators are seeking to reduce tax rates on slots.28 The Pennsylvania Senate approved 
a bill that would allow “small games of chance” at bars – similar to the West Virginia 
structure.29 The cannibalization literature has already examined the relationship between 
lottery and casino revenues (Economopoulos, 2012), but now researchers will need 
to take a closer look at internal markets to determine the optimal market structure for 
taxation. However, this study suggests that the optimal state revenues and structure must 
go beyond the borders of the individual state. 
 
27   New Jersey, Section 69A, 10/ 28/ 2013
28   http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/20/delaware-gambling-competition/2441541/ 
29   http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/10/editorial_pennsylvania_taking.html
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Data Appendix
Access: For each state a measurement of market access to playing a slot machine was 
calculated in each period. Access is calculated by dividing total slot machines by total 
market population density. A market population density measurement was calculated for 
each casino in the state in time period t. The population density for each county where a 
casino resided and the counties that were adjacent to the casino’s county was collected 
from the U.S. Census. A weighted average of the market population densities was 
calculated for the casino county. A 50% weight was given to the county where the casino 
resided and neighboring counties received equal proportioned weights. The total (state) 
market population density was the sum of the weighted average market population 
densities of the casinos in operation in that period.
Casinos: The number of casinos was tabulated from state gaming reports. In the case of 
New York, tribal casinos were included in the data. In 2001, West Virginia allowed up to 
ten video lottery terminals at adult establishments. A casino equivalent was calculated for 
these establishments by dividing the number of establishments by a fixed number equal 
to the average number of terminals per racino between 1997 and 2012. The equivalent 
was rounded to the nearest whole number.
Casino Revenue: Total casino revenues were collected from state gaming commissions. 
For Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and West Virginia, data were available or 
constructed from 1997-2012. For Pennsylvania, revenues were from 2006-2012, and in 
Maryland revenues were from 2010-2012. Casino revenues were estimated for New York 
for the period of 1997-2003. During this period only tribal casinos were in operation. 
Goss and Morse (2007) report AGR for NY tribes for 2003. NY Treasurer’s reports 
document all sources of revenues, and tribal revenue was not listed separately and was 
assumed to be included in the miscellaneous category. AGR as a percent of NY tax 
revenue was calculated for 2003 and was used to calculate AGR for previous years. The 
percent was adjusted for the number of casinos in the market. Real casino revenue was 
computed by dividing nominal casino revenue by a state price index. A state price index 
was created using the nominal gross state product and real gross state product provided 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Slots: The number of tribal slots in New York was taken from the tribe’s Web page. 
Connecticut was not included in New York’s calculation of neighboring slots, nor was 
Ohio’s in calculating Pennsylvania’s or West Virginia’s.
Weighted Matrix: Google maps was used to estimate distances between casinos and 
major population centers. For a casino state, the nearest casino to the population center 
was used to calculate the distance when a state did not have a casino. If two states had 
multiple casinos, the closest casinos were paired and the average distance was used. 
